CVE-2026-98978 - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: never expire a locked mount Locked moun
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: never expire a locked mount
Locked mounts are special. They protect the underlying files and
directories from being revealed. do_umount() refuses to unmount locked
mounts but shrink_submounts() doesn't.
A shrinkable mount can become locked once the owner of a user namespace
puts it beneath a locked mount with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. The locked
property now moves to the mount at the bottom making it possible to
unmount the top mount.
So umount() of an unlocked ancestor now expires the bottom mount first
and the covered directory is revealed:
move_mount(c -> x/hidden, MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) = 0
the cover after the lock moved: umount2(x/hidden) = 0
the holder of the lock: umount2(x/hidden) = EINVAL
the root of the copy, busy: umount2(x) = EBUSY
reads x/hidden/secret: "covered-by-root"
So leave a locked mount alone as it dies together with its parent. A
plain umount() of an unlocked mount with a locked one below it is EBUSY
from now on. It's the same for any other locked child. A lazy umount
still takes the whole tree.
mark_mounts_for_expiry() never sees a locked mount. lock_mnt_tree()
leaves a mount on an expiry list alone and nothing else puts a locked
one on such a list. Add an assert for this.
HIGH
Severity & confidence
Source severityhigh
Platform severityhigh
Confidencehigh
Exploitationunknown
CVSS8.4
Affected
Vendorslinux
Reporting sources (1)
NIST NVD - National Vulnerability Database
Timeline & provenance
Published2026-10-23T13:17:19
Last updated2026-10-26T08:36:50
Ingested2026-10-25T14:28:13
FreshnessNEAR-REAL-TIME
Threat typevulnerability
Recommended action
No recommended action published with this item - review the original source.
Next steps
- Identify affected systems in your environment.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation guidance.
- Review logs for indicators described in the advisory.
- Follow the affected vendor/product to track updates.
Confidence explanation
Reported by a government or cert-grade source (CISA, NCSC, NVD, ENISA, MSRC).
Source type: standards ยท Original: NIST NVD - National Vulnerability Database