GHSA-7wpf-ch8f-5f4x - signalk-server has SSRF via absolute signalk.appIcon URL in the app store icon fetcher
### Summary
The app store icon code (`dist/appstore/icon-probe.js` around line 200 and `icon-bytes.js` around line 138) resolves a plugin's declared `signalk.appIcon`. Relative paths are pinned to the CDN, but an absolute http(s) URL is used as-is: the server fetches it, follows redirects, and stores any `image/*` response as the plugin's icon, which is then served to the admin UI. Unrelated to GHSA-q59x-jc9f-gfqf.
### Affected
signalk-server 2.33.0 (latest).
### Reproduction
The real dist modules driven directly, Docker with `--network none`; a local "internal" service on 127.0.0.1 logs requests:
```
[CONTROL relative] declared=../../icon.png
resolved=null
internal-service hits: [] stored: null
[ATTACK absolute] declared=http://127.0.0.1:35013/latest/meta-data/iam
resolved=http://127.0.0.1:35013/latest/meta-data/iam
internal-service hits: ["GET /latest/meta-data/iam"] stored: .../icon-bytes/evil-plugin@1.0.0.png (70 bytes)
[ATTACK redirect] declared=http://127.0.0.1:35013/redir
internal-service hits: ["GET /redir","GET /internal-secret-via-redirect.png"] stored: .../icon-bytes/evil-plugin@1.0.0.png (70 bytes)
```
The modules were tested directly rather than through a full running server.
### Impact
Anyone who can get a plugin listed in the app store (publishing an npm package with the signalk keywords) can make every signalk-server that browses the app store send requests to internal addresses on the vessel network and to cloud metadata endpoints. Responses with an image content type are stored and served back to the user.
### Suggested fix
Only accept relative icon paths resolved against the CDN (or an https allowlist of known hosts), do not follow redirects to other hosts, and reject private, loopback and link-local addresses after resolution.
MEDIUM
Severity & confidence
Source severitymedium
Platform severitymedium
Confidencemedium
Exploitationunknown
CVSS4.2
Affected
Vendorssignalk-server
Productssignalk-server
Reporting sources (1)
GitHub Security Advisories
Timeline & provenance
Published2026-10-30T22:57:37
Last updated2026-11-09T09:35:06
Ingested2026-10-30T22:59:14
FreshnessNEAR-REAL-TIME
Threat typeadvisory
Recommended action
Review the advisory and upgrade affected packages to the first patched version.
Next steps
- Identify affected systems in your environment.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation guidance.
- Review logs for indicators described in the advisory.
- Follow the affected vendor/product to track updates.
Confidence explanation
Reported by a single or secondary source; treat as indicative, verify before acting.
Source type: vendor ยท Original: GitHub Security Advisories